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Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of introducing a majority electoral system for the 
Chamber of Deputies in the Czech Republic, and discusses the virtues and drawbacks of such a system. 
It recalculates the electoral results from two previous elections using majority electoral systems (first-past-
the-post and two round majority system) to examine how such a change could influence the formation 
of governmental majorities in the chamber and what the possible consequences for the quality 
of democracy in the Czech Republic could be. The results show that majority system would likely 
radically simplify the formation of governments with clear majorities, and hinder emerging populist 
parties as well as weaken the communist party. On the other hand, the adoption of a majority system 
would substantially lower barriers to enter the chamber, which could lead to the disintegration of the 
party system and its increased fragmentation. Combined with the common practice of Czech politicians 
to hold various mandates at different levels of the political system at the same time, this could 
be a significant risk factor. 
Keywords: Elections; Czech Politics; Electoral System; First-Past-the-Post; Two Round Majority 
System 
1. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, scholars have largely come to agree that the 
characteristics of the system used to elect the lower chamber of Parliament, the 
Chamber of Deputies, are a weakness of Czech democracy (Šedo 2009a; 2009b; 
Chytilek et al. 2009; Kubát 2013).2 The outcomes of the system since 1996 have 
                                                 
1 Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Joštova 10, 602 00 
Brno, Czech Republic. E-mail: mpink@seznam.cz. This article is an output of a Czech Science 
Foundation grant, code GA15-2274S (Quality of Democracy: Czech Republic in Comparative Perspective). I 
would like to thank Petr Voda for long-term cooperation in preparation of all maps. 
2 The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy with a bi-cameral parliament, consisting of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It is a clear example of asymmetric bicameralism, with the 
powers of the Chamber of Deputies stronger and, in many examples (such as legislative process), 
more decisive compared to those of the Senate. The Czech party system had been characterized 
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been considered the main source of government instability, due to ambiguously 
defined majorities in the chamber (Kubát 2013). The government that came to 
power in 2010 had a clear majority and it seemed that the problem had largely been 
solved,3 yet instead of government stability, disunity emerged in the parliamentary 
Public Affairs party (Věci veřejné, VV), originally a populist party that became a part 
of the government coalition. The VV party ultimately split into two. The subsequent 
early election in autumn 2013 produced a government coalition of three parties, and 
only time will tell whether what originally emerged as a populist movement and is 
now (as of October 2017) the second most important partner in government, the 
ANO 2011 movement (hereinafter ANO), will prove to be cohesive ibn the long 
term, or whether it will meet with a fate similar to that of Public Affairs, which 
immediately after the 2010 election also served as a pillar of government stability. 
At the time of writing it seems that discord is not in the offing for ANO, but this 
cannot be said with great certainty until a more distant future. Until 2010, the 
electoral system was unable to convert votes into seats in a manner that would 
secure a clear governmental majority in the chamber, and since 2010 its logic has 
also led to increased parliamentary presence of populist parties. 
When electoral reform was considered at various points over the past two 
decades, the alternatives proposed were based on (a) the established rules for 
proportional representation of candidate lists, varying the electoral formula merely 
by changing the electoral divisor, or constituency size; (b) the idea of awarding an 
electoral bonus, which was mooted, especially after the 2006 elections ended in 
a stalemate. With one exception (Kubát 2013), none of the proposals envisaged 
a more fundamental change by introducing a majority system for the election of the 
Chamber of Deputies. At a scholarly conference in November 2012 (Balík et al. 
2013) such an option was discussed, which led me to develop the idea further.  
The conference was organised by the group ‘Direct Election of Deputies 2014’ 
(Přímá volba poslanců 2014), which promoted the adoption of a majority electoral 
system and was supported by the prime minister at the time. The papers published 
in the conference proceedings evaluate the options for improving the Czech 
parliamentary regime: the authors agreed that an improvement was needed, but they 
failed to propose a clear solution. Primarily, the authors investigated the option of 
introducing a majority electoral system, and besides the proponents of a ‘relatively 
strong’ model (i.e. a two-round system), there were also those who focused on the 
                                                 
by low levels of volatility (see Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2010), which began to crumble in 2010. 
New parties, such as the rightist TOP 09 and the short-lived populist Public Affairs party entered 
the national political scene, followed by another populist party (ANO) and the far-right populist 
Úsvit in the early elections in 2013 (for a concise and insightful overview of the party system 
development in English see Balík and Hloušek 2016).  
3 On 10 August 2010, the newly-appointed government consisting of the ODS, TOP09 and VV 
won the chamber’s confidence on 118 votes, which was significantly above the required minimum 
(101 votes) and compared well with previous votes of confidence.  
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risks of such a system. Some of these authors argued that the potential benefits of 
the system would not outweigh its risks. 
Prior to the 2013 elections, politicians for the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská 
demokratická strana; ODS), especially Petr Sokol and the acting chair of the party, 
Martin Kuba, proposed to introduce a majority system. Since then, the populist 
parties, Tomio Okamura’s Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit přímé demokracie, Dawn) 
and the populist movement ANO, which entered government after the 2013 
elections, have also started publicly advocating the introduction of a majority 
system.4 Some scholars (Kubát 2013; Kocmánek 2006) have argued in favour of 
such a change, while others (Jelínek 2013) have been critical of the idea. Still others 
prefer to keep the existing proportional system, but with the proviso of awarding 
a substantial bonus to the winning party (Novák 2013). Supporters of electoral 
reform advocating a majority system see the benefits in easier government 
formation, a clear definition of opposition and the curtailment of populist and/or 
isolated parties that sit in the Chamber of Deputies and complicate the formation 
of working government coalitions. 
Generally, when evaluating majority systems, Czech scholarly contributions 
(see also Lebeda 2000; Šedo 2014), apart from modelling various variants of 
proportional systems, fail to proceed beyond generic conclusions based on 
experiences from abroad. This paper therefore seeks to sketch the contours of 
a possible majoritarian reform. I specifically aim to provide an example of what the 
results of the elections to the chamber might look like under a first-past-the-post 
and a two-round system, and point out both the possible benefits and the 
drawbacks of such systems, should either be used in the first-order-elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
This article thus has a limited purpose and ambition. It does not aim to 
simulate the outcome of elections under a different electoral system, since it is not 
possible to predict the psychological effects of such a change on either voters or 
parties. Instead, I use the actual electoral results to demonstrate the mechanical 
effects of the proposed electoral reform in the Czech Republic. This should allow 
the reader to form an idea about what the consequences of a change would be, 
which is necessary to evaluate the benefits and consequences for Czech democracy 
of switching the system. The key issues in this sense are (a) whether clearer 
majorities in the chamber could be expected following the change, (b) the effect on 
populist parties that have emerged over the six years since 2010, and (c) the position 
of smaller parties under the alternative systems, particularly that of the Communist 
Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM), which 
                                                 
4 ‘We want a majority electoral system. There will be no more excuses,’ said the leader of the ANO 
movement, Andrej Babiš, interviewed on Václav Moravec’s regular programme on Rádio Impuls 
(recording and transcript available at http://www.impuls.cz/clanky/2013/10/video-andrej-babis-
chceme-vetsinovy-volebni-system/). 
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is considered anti-system by most authors (Kubát 2013; Cabada and Šanc 2005; 
Hloušek and Kopeček 2010).  
I am aware that modelling electoral outcomes to evaluate the effects 
of electoral reform is controversial and has many limitations.5 This is why I explain 
my reasoning in more detail below, after a brief overview of the current electoral 
system and its history and an equally brief discussion of the characteristics of the 
majoritarian system. This article purposely does not deal with the politics of 
electoral reform and the normative aspects of the proposed changes in detail. Such 
discussions (in Czech) can be found in the original conference proceedings (Balík 
et al. 2013). 
 
2. Electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies and its changes  
Article 18 of the Czech Constitution (Act No. 1/1993 Coll.) states that 
a proportional system is used to elect the Chamber of Deputies, but does not 
specify details. It also stipulates a majority system for elections to the upper 
chamber, the Senate, similarly without giving any further details. These are set in 
Act No. 247/1995 Coll., which has been amended multiple times. Electoral reform 
was first seriously discussed in 1998, when, following an agreement with the 
opposition ODS, the winner of the elections, the Social Democratic Party (Česká strana 
sociálně demokratická, ČSSD), created a minority cabinet. An integral part of the 
agreement that determined the position of the government was the condition that 
there would be electoral reform, with the aims of facilitating government formation 
for the electorally more successful parties and strengthening the government’s 
position in the Czech political system. However, given the make-up of the Senate 
at the time, an amendment to the Constitution was not viable, and hence a change 
in electoral law to the effect of preserving the proportional system, but making it 
more majoritarian, seemed a workable solution. Following lengthy negotiations, 
a reform was devised that would divide the country into 35 constituencies, increase 
the threshold for coalitions, and introduce a modified D’Hondt divisor for 
converting votes into seats.6 However, in its ruling No. 64/2001 Coll., the 
Constitutional Court annulled the reform without a vote ever being held according 
to the new rules. The court’s ruling forced the political leaders to come up with 
a quick amendment, which continues to be in force today. The Czech Republic is 
divided into 14 constituencies, whose boundaries correspond to those of the 
                                                 
5 There is a large body of literature discussing what kinds of factors, apart from and including the 
mechanical effects of the electoral system, influence electoral outcomes and subsequently the whole 
party system (such as Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1968; Downs 1957; 
Riker 1982; Lijphart 1990; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997). 
6 The divisor started with the value of 1.42 and was named the ‘Koudelka divisor’ after its proponent 
Zdeněk Koudelka (see e.g. Koudelka 2000; Kostelecký 2004). 
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country’s self-governing regions, and the classic D’Hondt method is used to 
transform votes into seats. 
In mid-2006, there was another unexpected election result, and the allocation 
of seats in the chamber precluded the formation of a workable majority 
government. Thus, in subsequent years, an electoral reform was again on the table. 
The aim was not so much to push smaller parties into the background as it was to 
preserve (or increase) proportionality, with a bonus awarded to the winning party. 
This was not at the expense of smaller parties, which were now potential coalition 
partners, but rather at the expense of the second most successful party 
(Šedo 2009b). With the fall of the government in March 2009, the proposal never 
got past its early-draft stage, and no serious electoral reform has been put on the 
government’s agenda since. Scholars, however, have not abandoned the issue, and 
in autumn 2012 the above-mentioned conference entitled ‘Is a majority electoral 
system suitable for the Czech Chamber of Deputies?’ took place, at which various 
options were analysed. Beyond earlier proposals that addressed purely technical 
matters of altering proportional representation, the principles of majority electoral 
systems were also discussed, and this paper follows upon these discussions. 
 
3. Why think this way: justifying the author’s intention 
There have already been several studies of Czech electoral reform that considered 
changes in the method for converting votes into seats whilst preserving 
proportional representation. Since 2002 there have been multiple articles discussing 
potential reform, but they all envisaged a list-proportional system (Šedo 2009b; 
Lebeda 2004). These papers discussed potential election results under alternative 
ways of transforming votes into seats, and assessed various options in terms of their 
ability to produce a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, as well as other aspects. 
In doing so they assumed that voters’ decision-making would not be affected by 
electoral-law amendments modifying the electoral formula, constituency sizes, etc. 
 I make the same assumption in my models, which consider the hypothetical 
introduction of a majority system. In doing so I also draw among others on the 
French experience where the electoral system has been modified multiple times 
over the last century, using both majority and proportional elements. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, deputies to the National Assembly obtained their 
legitimacy on the basis of a two-round majority system whose limiting effects were 
minimal. Immediately after 1945, a proportional representation system applied, 
which was soon replaced by other systems. In 1958 a two-round majority system 
was introduced, in which the second round was gradually closed to candidates of 
political parties that failed to poll 5 %, later 10 % and eventually 12.5 % of all 
registered voters. There were other subsequent changes: in 1986 a proportional 
electoral system was introduced and then swiftly amended after coming into force. 
In 1988, voting reverted to majority rules. However, during all this time there has 
Possible Outcomes of Introducing a Majority System for Elections  
 
 
140 
never been a one-off, substantial change in the patterns of how regions vote, and 
the départements that have long supported the left and the liberals, or, by contrast, 
the right and the conservatives, tend not to switch their allegiances (Lacoste 1986). 
Until 2010, local elections in municipalities of up to 20,000 inhabitants 
in Poland were held according to a proportional system. a majority electoral system 
was adopted in 2014 (except for large cities which continue to vote under 
a proportional system). a study describing the side effects of the change in terms of 
fragmentation and change in voters’ strategies has concluded that the latter have 
not been substantially affected (Gendzwiłł and Zółtak 2016). 
Whereas in a proportional electoral system the method for converting votes 
into seats is given much attention, in a majority system the demarcation of 
constituencies comes to the fore (not that this aspect would be unimportant in 
a proportional system, but it is merely one of its four fundamental characteristics, 
along with the electoral divisor, threshold and number of seats per constituency; 
cf. Lebeda 2001). As long as equality of suffrage is an objective, the size of 
constituencies and especially the delimitation of their boundaries are crucial. The 
fundamental principles of elections, as stipulated in the Czech Constitution and 
international documents, call for universal, direct, equal, free and secret suffrage. 
There are, however, certain risks attached to the establishment of constituencies, 
the most important being malapportionment7 and the other gerrymandering.8 
Having taken all this into account, I believe that recalculating existing electoral 
results under different electoral systems can provide valuable insights into the 
                                                 
7 Malapportionment describes a situation where seats are unequally allocated to constituencies, 
giving different weights to individual votes. Such a situation can arise from an administrative 
measure, creating more and less populous constituencies. a good example would be a higher number 
of constituencies (recalculated per voter) in the capital at the expense of peripheral areas. Such 
a situation may arise through inactivity, when the population size in cities and the countryside 
changes due to migration and this trend is not reflected in corresponding changes to constituency 
boundaries (see e.g. Griffith 1907, Dixon 1968, Katz 1998, Rush 1993). In Europe, discrepancies of 
around 10 % are considered acceptable, whereas a 15 % discrepancy usually demands action. This 
is largely the practice, although the Constitutional Council in France has allowed a higher, 20 %, 
difference to remain (Antoš 2013: 140). In the Czech Republic, the Act No. 247/1995 Coll. stipulates 
that the boundaries of Senate constituencies are amended when the difference reaches 15 %. 
8 Gerrymandering is an intentional manipulation of constituencies aiming to give one political party 
an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the 
opposition in as few districts as possible favouring a specific group of candidates (see e.g. 
Gerrymandering n.d.). The term originated in the USA in the early nineteenth century. In essence, 
it describes a situation where the electoral support for a candidate is scattered across multiple 
constituencies, or, by contrast, the votes for a candidate are concentrated into a single constituency. 
a clear example is provided by a change of boundaries of a constituency where an ethnic minority, 
or the electorate of an opposition candidate, are strong. a good preventive measure is to observe the 
country’s administrative territorial units and the principle of geographical contiguity. The question 
then is who should be making the changes. Ideally, it should be a body with parity representation of 
those contesting elections and the judiciary (for more detail see e.g. Shapiro 1984]. 
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(possible) effects of electoral reform. Of course, any conclusions drawn from such 
models are only tentative and should be treated as such. To give a concrete example, 
I will choose two types of majority system. One is the classic first-past-the-post 
system, well known in the Anglo-Saxon world and used among European countries 
solely in Britain. There are two main reasons for selecting this system for study: 
First, it is easy to model and hence to show which party would obtain the most 
votes in the proposed constituencies; and second, this was the model publicly 
advocated by ODS politicians prior to 2013. The other system is a two-round 
system which follows the rules presently in force for elections to the upper chamber 
of the Czech Parliament, the Senate.  
Let me finally add a couple of words on constituencies. Under a majority 
system, the design of constituencies is key, and perhaps even more important than 
actual voting by the electorate. The territory of the Czech Republic would be 
divided into 200 constituencies, i.e. the same number of units as there presently are 
MPs in the lower chamber. In order for all votes to have approximately the same 
weight, the constituencies should be about the same size in terms of the number of 
registered voters. A similar rule would apply as the one in force for Senate elections, 
where a constituency boundary is amended if the difference (growth or reduction) 
in its electorate reaches 15 %. For our model of elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies, the constituencies would each have about 42,000 voters9 – a figure based 
on the total number of electors included on the register, divided by 200 (the number 
of seats). Our second rule is to respect as much as possible the country’s 
administrative boundaries, so that those which have been in place are observed. 
Thus, no constituency will cross regional boundaries (as is the case in Senate 
constituencies); and the country’s administrative structure as applies to collecting 
taxes, duties etc. will be taken into consideration to the greatest possible extent. The 
administrative districts of municipalities with extended powers, or, in relevant cases, 
those with commissioned local authority, will serve as the basis for our 
constituencies. Designing constituencies under these rules is not easy, but it is 
possible. Strict adherence to the rules would prevent any manipulation of 
constituency boundaries that aimed to influence election results. 
 
4. Effects of electoral reform10 
Electoral reform is an often-studied topic and published works as well as other 
sources tell us that there is no universally valid and suitable procedure to achieve it. 
Since 1990 we have witnessed several instances of substantial change in electoral 
                                                 
9 The calculation for 2013 (total number of voters/200) comes up with an average constituency size 
of 42,122 voters. 
10 This section provides only a very brief introduction; for a more detailed and informed discussion 
see any of the volumes mentioned here or Dunleavy-Margetts (1995). 
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systems, both in established democracies and in countries undergoing 
transformation, most of them in Central and Eastern Europe. The former group 
includes Italy, Japan and New Zealand, with both proportional (Italy) and majority 
(New Zealand) systems being adjusted. In both these cases, the reform did not 
result in a different majority or proportional system being adopted; rather, both 
countries adopted a system of mixed-member proportional representation, 
somewhere between a proportional and a majority system.  
These and other examples of reform have been described in an important 
volume edited by Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg (2003a). The 
contributors observed mixed systems for two or three electoral terms, focusing on 
these systems’ suitability for overcoming the shortcomings of previous systems, 
while preserving stability. Their main conclusion was that, to be successful, the 
reformed system should (1) offer a clear government–opposition choice, one that 
could be endorsed by a majority of voters (the interparty dimension), and 
(2) encourage parties and politicians to campaign on the basis of broad collective 
policy programmes (the intraparty dimension) (Shugart 2003: 29). 
Systematic analyses of electoral systems can be found in the volume edited by 
Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (2005) which, apart from comparative 
chapters, incorporates case studies of individual countries grouped by the type of 
electoral system, including some of those mentioned here. While not focusing 
specifically on electoral reform as such, the volume deals with the issue extensively, 
drawing attention, among other things, to the barriers to change, such as incumbent 
parties, institutional barriers, and the electorate itself. Even if proponents of 
electoral reform manage to overcome these barriers, they can be disappointed with 
the results of electoral reform. a study edited by Bowler and Donovan (2013) shows 
that institutional effects of electoral change are influenced by a number of other 
factors, including economic and socio-political developments, attitudes and 
behaviour of both parties and the electorate, and so on.  
Another important work edited by André Blais (2008) covers electoral reform 
in countries using the first-past-the-post system. The authors describe the 
arguments of actors as to whether or not to change the existing rules. They conclude 
that changing an electoral system is no easy matter. Finally, Alan Renwick (2010) 
studied electoral reforms over the long term in multiple countries. He analysed the 
countries that have already been studied by others and added France, where over 
the past century or so the electoral system has been modified several times. 
Of all the cases covered in these volumes, post-1993 Italy comes closest to the 
reform of the Czech parliamentary elections considered in this paper. In Italy, 
a strongly proportional system was changed to a mixed one, with 75 % of the seats 
elected via the majority method. One chapter in Shugart and Wattenberg (2003) 
describes the unexpected effects of the Italian reform. Since 1993 the party system 
has not yet become stabilised; rather, the opposite is true, and the index of the 
effective number of parties (a measure of party competition) reached a historical 
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maximum after the reform (D’Alimonte 2003: 326).11 Political parties entering into 
election coalitions campaigned together, but this unity was short-lived and has not 
created bipartism (D’Alimonte and Bartolini 2002). 
 
5. Recalculated election results 
a. First-past-the-post system (FPTP) 
Czech politicians (Martin Kuba, Petr Sokol) as well as scholars (Kocmánek 2006) 
have argued in favour of a first-past-the-post system in the Czech Republic. This 
electoral system has long been primarily associated with the United Kingdom, 
where it has been securing legitimacy for government for more than a century, and 
also with India, the most populous democracy in the world. Though in use in 47 
countries, which account for 43.5 % of the world’s population (Reynolds et al. 
2005), it is often subjected to attempts at electoral reform.12 Most of the countries 
using the FPTP system are former British imperial territories, such as Canada, India, 
Bangladesh, and African countries. No country in Continental Europe uses this 
system, and hence the idea of introducing FPTP in the Czech Republic runs counter 
to the established trends, effectively proposing to introduce a ‘foreign’ element to 
European practice. There are also those who say that FPTP will fall into disuse 
(ibid.). The FPTP system has four fundamental characteristics: It is a single-round 
election of one candidate in a single-member constituency, with whoever wins the 
most votes being declared the winner. 
The system is simple and intelligible to the electorate in terms of what happens 
with their votes. There is no need for a complicated conversion of votes into seats 
of the kind required in proportional systems – a procedure often opaque even to 
politicians themselves. Voters thus do not feel deceived, as they might under, say, 
a seat-allocation method that uses multiple rounds of counting, which has various 
side effects.13 The chief expected benefit of the FPTP system is that it offers to 
voters a clear choice between two alternatives and significantly limits the chances 
of third and new parties. It can be thus expected that the system will offer two 
viable options, one left-wing and the other right-wing. Hence it should produce 
a single party government, though that is not necessarily always the case – one such 
example was the UK between 2010 and 2015. 
Let me now compare Czech parties and their electoral results. Our first 
example is based on the most recent elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2013, 
                                                 
11 The effective number of parliamentary parties increased from 3.1 in 1976 to 4.1 in 1987 and to 
7.0 in 1994.  
12 a good example of a country that abandoned the FPTP system is New Zealand, where a mixed 
member proportional system replaced the FPTP in 1993 (see Vowles 2005).  
13 Here i mention the electoral system used for local elections in the Czech Republic. It is not easy 
to explain to failed candidates why they have not been awarded seats despite having polled more 
votes than their opponents who did get the mandate.  
Possible Outcomes of Introducing a Majority System for Elections  
 
 
144 
when seven parties crossed the 5 % threshold and the winner took a mere 50 seats. 
This was the weakest showing of a winning party in the history of the Czech 
Chamber of Deputies. There are also parties in the chamber that have relatively 
small seat shares, about 15 each. 
If we recalculate under the FPTP system the votes cast according to the 
constituencies we have designed, we can see that the winner of the election, the 
ČSSD, would be awarded 112 seats. This means a more than a 100 % increase, 
a result that would be sufficient for the ČSSD to form a majority government. The 
results of other parties are also interesting: ANO would place second, but the 
difference in seats obtained, compared to both the present system and what the 
ČSSD would receive, would be minimal. TOP09 would get an almost negligible 
gain of two seats. All other parties would receive either far fewer seats (KSČM) 
or none at all (ODS, KDU-ČSL and Dawn). 
 
Table 1: Model calculation of election results for 2013 
2013 ČSSD ANO KSČM TOP09 ODS Dawn KDU-ČSL 
Result (%) 20.45 18.65 14.91 11.99 7.72 6.88 6.78 
Actual 50 47 33 26 16 14 14 
FPTP 112 54 6 28 0 0 0 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
 
The model calculation for 2010 shows an even greater incidence 
of majoritarian elements. The winner of the election, the ČSSD, would obtain 
122 seats, while other parties would receive fewer seats than under the present 
system. The ODS would lose 4, TOP09, hitherto in government, 12. KSČM and 
the populist VV party would not win a single seat. Thus there would be in the lower 
chamber a clear government majority and two programmatically close opposition 
parties.  
 
Table 2: Model calculation of election results for 2010 
2010 ČSSD ODS TOP09 KSČM VV 
Result (%) 22.08 20.22 16.70 11.27 10.88 
Actual 56 53 41 26 24 
FPTP 122 49 29 0 0 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
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The last example compares the actual and recalculated results of the 2006 
election, whose results made finding a workable majority in the chamber proved 
particularly difficult. The ODS as the winner was unable to form a coalition 
government. There followed a short period of its minority cabinet, which failed to 
win the chamber’s confidence. The ODS chair, re-appointed as PM, then proposed 
a coalition government which won confidence, thanks to two social-democratic 
MPs leaving the chamber before the vote. This shaky majority spurred electoral 
reform, which was however never put into practice because the government fell in 
early 2009. The calculation shows that under the FPTP system the ODS would get 
31 more seats and would thus command a comfortable majority of 112 MPs. The 
opposition (ČSSD) would have 88 seats; no other parties would be present in the 
chamber. 
 
Table 3: Model calculation of election results for 2006 
2006 ODS ČSSD KSČM KDU-ČSL SZ 
Result (%) 35.58 32.32 12.81 7.22 6.29 
Actual 81 74 26 13 6 
FPTP 112 88 0 0 0 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
 
All of the above shows that if FPTP were introduced in the Czech Republic, 
the winner of elections would get an absolute (101) or even a qualified (three-fifths, 
i.e. 120) majority in the chamber, the latter being necessary to change the 
constitution. This would be true of ODS (2006) and ČSSD (2010 and 2013), parties 
which won but did not always get the chance to form a government and fill the post 
of prime minister. Second, the KSČM, an extreme party which the other parties 
have decided to exclude from forming national-level governments, would be unable 
to win as many seats as it does under the present system. The KDU-ČSL and the 
Green Party (Strana zelených, SZ) as the smallest successful in the 2006 election would 
also lose out. The third expected characteristic would be the presence of a distinct 
and homogeneous opposition. 
Beyond the allocation of seats, it is interesting to observe how these would be 
distributed regionally. Figure 1 shows the changes the model would bring for the 
2013 election. TOP09 would become a party with MPs elected in Prague and some 
adjacent constituencies in the Central Bohemia region. The six MPs for KSČM 
would be all elected in the Ústí nad Labem region. ANO would win no seats in the 
South Moravia, Moravia-Silesia or Vysočina regions; whereas ČSSD would fail 
utterly in Prague and the Liberec region. 
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Figure 1: Model of election results under the FPTP system, 2013 
 
Source: Own map/www.volby.cz. 
 
Figure 2: Model of election results under the FPTP system, 2010 
 
Source: Own map/www.volby.cz. 
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Similar regional discrepancies in seat allocation can also be observed in Figure 
2 for the 2010 elections. The ČSSD would get no seats in Prague, but would win all 
constituencies in Moravia-Silesia and Ústí nad Labem regions. ODS and TOP09 
would get most of their MPs from Prague, Central Bohemia and five further 
constituencies in East Bohemia. The ODS would also get some MPs in the South 
Moravia and Zlín regions, but their numbers would be limited. 
The model for 2006 shows clear regional polarisation. ODS would obtain seats 
primarily in Prague and the Central Bohemia, South Bohemia and Hradec Králové 
regions. By contrast, in the Moravia-Silesia region where ČSSD would score a clear 
victory, ODS would be eliminated – as the ČSSD would be in Prague. 
 
Figure 3: Model of election results under the FPTP system, 2006 
 
Source: Own map/www.volby.cz. 
 
An evaluation of disproportionality should be an integral part of assessing 
electoral systems and their effects. Here I show the potential impact of majoritarian 
reform using the Loosemore-Hanby index.14 Should the FPTP system be adopted, 
disproportionality would increase: from 12.62 to 45.91 for 2013, from 18.85 to 
43.20 for 2010 and from 9.99 to 32.30 for 2006. This clearly shows the other face 
of adopting the FPTP system. 
 
                                                 
14 The Loosemore-Hanby index measures the disproportionality of electoral systems. It computes 
the absolute difference between votes cast and seats obtained using a formula (Grilli di Cortona 
et al. 1999). 
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Table 4: Comparison of disproportionality under the present and the FPTP systems  
Elections   Actual system FPTP 
2013 12.62 45.91 
2010 18.85 43.20 
2006 9.99 32.30 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
b. Two-round majority system: the Senate model applied to the 
Chamber of Deputies15 
Since its inception in 1996, the Senate as the upper chamber of the Czech 
Parliament has been voted in on the basis of a two-round majority electoral system, 
the second round (run-off) being held if no candidate polls an absolute majority of 
votes in the first round. There have been only nine instances of candidates winning 
an absolute majority in the first round, and since 2008 a run-off has always been 
held in every constituency. In the recalculation of the results of the three most 
recent elections to the Chamber of Deputies, no candidate (political party) would 
win a constituency in the first round; hence a run-off would always take place. 
According to Giovanni Sartori, this system punishes ideological politics and 
rewards pragmatic politics (Sartori 1997). 
France is one country in Europe which uses this method to elect its legislature. 
Two-round voting has been in force there since the 1950s, while an experiment 
with proportional representation in 1986 was soon abandoned, thus confirming that 
the two-round majority system is a suitable way for granting legitimacy to MPs in 
the country. Unlike the method used to elect the Czech Senate, in France the second 
round is open to more than two candidates: all who poll more than 12.5 % of the 
votes of all registered electors pass to the second round. In theory, therefore, a voter 
might encounter more than three candidates in the second round, but this has not 
occurred for a long time.16 Also the advancement of more than two candidates to 
the second round has been quite infrequent; though when such cases occurred, they 
were closely watched.17 However, these multi-party second rounds have not 
                                                 
15 More detailed results of each party in the second round are provided in the Appendices. 
16 Out of the total of 577 constituencies, more than two candidates progressed in 11 constituencies 
in 2002, in one constituency in 2007 and in 44 constituencies in 2012 (Le Ministère de 
l'intérieur n.d.). 
17 Classic examples include National Front (FN) candidates, who had been however unsuccessful in 
the run-off until 2012; or local politicians able to push national politicians into the background. In 
2012, an independent left-wing candidate Olivier Falorni passed to the second round and 
subsequently won the seat, beating off Ségolene Royal, the Socialist Party (PS) candidate who had 
previously stood for election as the country’s president. The centrist candidate F. Bayrou and the 
FN leader M. Le Pen have been also successful in this way.  
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fundamentally disrupted the workings of the electoral system, or the resultant 
majority in the National Assembly.  
It is important to note that under such a set-up the parties themselves might 
behave somewhat differently. In France, for instance, we have witnessed a number 
of coalitions in which ideologically close parties have been able to field a joint 
candidate or candidate list (see e.g. Elgie 2005). Whether such an effect would also 
be obtained in a post-reform Czech Republic is an open question. Given the 
recurrent practice in Senate elections, where two ideologically close parties who are 
in government together choose to field competing candidates, one may assume that 
parties would not be much inclined to create such coalitions. 
A fundamental characteristic of a two-round electoral system is that voters vote 
repeatedly. Sartori (1997) described it as a system in which voters may freely express 
their preferences in the first round. Their freedom there is maximal, similar to that 
available in a proportional representation system. The first round serves as 
a selection – something like a primary election – producing the group of candidates 
that enjoy the greatest support of the electorate. In the second round, the voters 
are often pushed by the majority will towards their second or third preference. 
Crucial for success, therefore, is to increase one’s share of the vote between the first 
and second rounds. The votes of those who opted for candidates that were 
eliminated in the first round are of decisive importance for the result of the second 
(final) round. According to Sartori, the system thus produces flexible parties (ones 
able to accommodate both majority and proportional rules) and calms politics 
down. Parties described by Sartori as extremist, extreme or isolated tend to lose out 
under this system. 
In what follows, a variant of a two-round system is applied to the political 
environment of the Czech Republic. As mentioned above, it is the method used to 
elect the upper chamber of the Czech Parliament (the Senate). If no candidate wins 
absolute majority in the first round, the top two candidates contest the second. This 
model has been used in the Czech lands for more than a hundred years.  
Senate election results between 1996 and 2008 (Navrátil 2010) show that 
candidates of different parties vary in their ability to win. Winning a seat in the first 
round is a possibility, but in actuality this has only happened in nine cases out of 
the about 330 total, making the advancement to the second round much more likely. 
ODS candidates are generally among those who do pass to the second round, with 
only the ČSSD candidates being able to compete in this regard. Small parties were 
successful in 1998 and 2000 when they worked together in the Coalition of Four 
(Čtyřkoalice, 4K). The lead enjoyed by ODS candidates after the first round however 
subsequently results in a certain isolation, since the high number of candidates 
advancing to the second round does not translate to the number of seats won. The 
candidates of other parties do better in the second round, with the exception of 
KSČM, whose candidates are even more isolated than those of ODS. An interesting 
group are politicians who are elected either without party support or with backing 
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by regional groupings of marginal national influence. Such candidates do also win 
seats, even if rarely.18 It needs to be noted that Senate elections are, in many 
respects, second-order elections. Accordingly, voter turnout is low and candidates 
opposing the government (or those from minor coalition parties) are more likely to 
win seats, especially if elections to the Senate are held at the mid-term point of 
a government’s mandate. The tables and maps that follow are based on the 
application of the Senate electoral system to elections to the Chamber of Deputies. 
Parties’ potential ability to win seats in the second round of voting is also noted, in 
accordance with Navrátil (2008). 
 
Table 5: Model calculation of election results for 2013 – numbers of candidates 
advancing to the second round  
2013 ČSSD ANO KSČM TOP09 ODS Dawn KDU-ČSL 
Result (%) 20.45 18.65 14.91 11.99 7.72 6.88 6.78 
Actual 50 47 33 26 16 14 14 
Passing  156 150 49 39 2 0 4 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
Table 5 shows that, apart from Dawn, all parties currently in the chamber 
would get their candidates into the second round of a majority system. However, 
the number of passing candidates differs widely across parties. ČSSD and ANO 
would each have 150 or more candidates in the second round, with ČSSD being 
slightly ahead. TOP09 and KSČM would have 49 and 39 candidates respectively 
advancing to the second round – both relatively large groups whose order of 
magnitude corresponds to the actual results under the present system. With the 
remaining parties, however, the discrepancy between actual results and the 
projected numbers of passing candidates under the two-round system is profound. 
The KDU-ČSL would get only 4 candidates in the second round and the ODS 2. 
Given such significant differences in the numbers of passing candidates, it makes 
sense to analyse the possible second round in greater detail and within a regional 
comparison. Especially for KDU-ČSL, the results in terms of the ability of party 
candidates to pass to the second round are interesting: the party would fare much 
worse under the modelled conditions than it presently does in Senate elections. In 
the elections to the upper chamber, the party is presently able not just to pass to 
the second round but also to win seats.19 In my model of the electoral system, 
a higher voter turnout is envisaged, because turnout for the Chamber of Deputies 
                                                 
18 Truly independent and non-party candidates elected have included Zdeněk Nytra (2016), Petr 
Skála (2006) and, in a by-election, Václav Fišer (1999).  
19 As of 2017, the KDU-ČSL parliamentary party group in the Senate has 16 members (including 
non-partisans aligned with the party), accounting for almost 20 % of the Senate.  
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elections is about 20–30 percentage points higher than for the Senate elections. 
Thus, what matters for the party result is not just the votes it has managed to win, 
but also the number of votes polled by its competitors. 
Figure 4 shows that electoral competition in individual regions would 
be shaped very differently. In Prague, TOP09 would advance to the second round 
in every constituency, facing ODS in two cases and ANO in the remaining ones. 
All other parties would be eliminated, and hence the votes that were actually cast 
for ČSSD, KSČM and KDU-ČSL candidates would, in theory, decide the second 
round. TOP09 would also advance in the Central Bohemia and Liberec regions, 
and, in one constituency per region, in the Hradec Králové and South Moravia 
regions. Everywhere else the party would be eliminated from the second round. 
ČSSD, by contrast, would get its candidates to the second round in all regions 
except Prague, competing most often against ANO, KSČM, and, in the South 
Moravia and Zlín regions, against KDU-ČSL or TOP09. In the Liberec and Ústí 
nad Labem regions, the second round would be particularly interesting, with KSČM 
and ANO candidates facing each other in six constituencies. It would be pure 
speculation to predict the result of such a contest; still, I venture to argue that 
KSČM’s ability to capitalise on its gains in the first round would turn out to be 
limited, and the party would probably find it more difficult to win seats than ANO. 
 
Figure 4: Model of candidates passing to the second round in 2013 
 
Source: Own map/www.volby.cz.  
 
The numbers of candidates passing to the second round under the simulated 
2010 election reveals that in this case the actual winner of the election would not 
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be the party with the highest number of candidates in the second round. ODS, 
which placed second according to popular vote, would have most candidates 
advancing (171); by contrast, the ČSSD would contest the run-off 
in 151 constituencies. Fifty-two TOP09 candidates would enter the second round. 
For the remaining two parties, the eliminating influence of this electoral system 
would be obvious: VV, whose support was spread equally across the country, would 
only have one candidate in the second round, while KSČM would have 17, most of 
them facing ČSSD candidates. 
 
Table 6: Model calculation of election results for 2010 – numbers of candidates 
advancing to the second round 
2010 ČSSD ODS TOP09 KSČM VV 
Result (%) 22.08 20.22 16.70 11.27 10.88 
Actual 56 53 41 26 24 
Passing 151 179 52 17 1 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
 
Figure 5: Model of candidates passing to the second round in 2010 
 
Source: Own map/www.volby.cz.  
 
Figure 5 provides an instructive picture of how the second round of voting 
would look in 2010. As in 2013, there is a notable difference between Prague and 
the rest of the country. In Prague the contest would be held between ODS and 
TOP09 candidates. The situation would be similar in some regions, especially in or 
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around large cities. In other regions the contest would be between ČSSD and ODS 
candidates. 
Also of interest are constituencies where two leftist candidates (i.e. of ČSSD 
and KSČM) would pass to the second round. There would be one such constituency 
in each of the Plzeň, Karlovy Vary, Ústí nad Labem and Pardubice regions, and 
multiple cases in all regions located in Moravia, with the exception of the Zlín 
region. As might be expected, the greatest number of such constituencies would be 
found in Moravia-Silesia. In three regions we find one constituency with a contest 
between ČSSD and TOP09 candidates. One constituency in the Ústí nad Labem 
region would see a candidate of the VV party competing against a ČSSD candidate. 
To complete the picture I also provide Table 7 which shows the number of 
advancing candidates per party in 2006 – the year when establishing governmental 
majority in the lower chamber was particularly problematic. 
 
Table 7: Model calculation of election results for 2006 – numbers of candidates 
advancing to the second round 
2006 ODS ČSSD KSČM KDU-ČSL SZ 
Result (%) 35.58 32.32 12.81 7.22 6.29 
Actual 81 74 26 13 6 
Passing 200 200 0 0 0 
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
 
As captured in Figure 6, this clearly shows that the second round would be 
a contest between ODS and ČSSD candidates only. Who would ultimately win is 
a big unknown, since low predictability is one of the better-known attributes of this 
electoral system. 
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Figure 6: Model of candidates passing to the second round in 2006 
 
Source: Own map/www.volby.cz.  
 
6. Discussion  
In addition to the possible results of the electoral reform, which promise easier 
majorities in the Chamber of Deputies, one also needs to note the weaknesses, or, 
as the case may be, the risks inherent in the change. Beyond the very set-up of 
constituency boundaries and other circumstances that are technical and 
administrative in character, there are two related weaknesses. (1) The first is 
a fundamental change with regard to the threshold which parties have to reach in 
order to win seats, and which currently sits at at 5 % nationwide. Removing this 
threshold might spur a disintegration of the party system, allowing people 
independent on the parties to win seats. While the level at which the electoral 
threshold is set is one of the fundamental characteristics of a proportional system, 
it is wholly absent in the majority system. The issues associated with the electoral 
threshold in the Czech Republic have been widely analysed both theoretically and 
empirically in scholarly literature (e.g. Lebeda 2001; Čaloud and Matušková 2006; 
Pink and Valterová 2010). a fundamental finding of this literature is that under the 
present 5 % threshold, a party must poll about 230,000 votes nationally to be 
allocated seats. Within the individual constituencies (regions), one seat corresponds 
to roughly 20,000 votes (i.e. the quotient as determined by electoral formula). 
However, winning 20,000 votes does not necessarily mean that a seat will be 
allocated as the number of required votes differs across constituencies, depending 
on other circumstances – above all the number of unsuccessful candidate lists of 
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parties contesting the election in a given constituency. In order to win seats, 
candidates must therefore clear several obstacles: First, they must win their party 
nomination, i.e. a place on the candidate list that actually stands a fair chance of 
being elected; and second, their party must then poll more than 5 % of the vote 
nationally and win about 20,000 votes in the constituency (this assumes, of course, 
that the candidate is in the top position on her party’s candidate list in the region). 
The adoption of a majority system would lower this barrier substantially. 
a division of the Czech Republic into 200 constituencies would mean about 42,000 
registered voters per constituency. Given that in the three most recent elections the 
turnout was about 60 %,20 one can assume that about 25,000 voters per constituency 
would show up on the election day. Under such circumstances an absolute majority 
of votes would be 12,501 or more. Obviously, one cannot predict what the exact 
turnout would be, but it is more likely to be a lower rather than a higher number. 
Compared to the present situation when a much greater number of votes are 
needed to win seats and these votes must be distributed spatially, the new system 
would place a much less stringent requirement on candidates in terms of their ability 
to attract votes. If a majority system is adopted, the requirements for winning a seat 
in the lower chamber will decrease substantially. We would thus have newly elected 
MPs whose electoral support was low, and in fact marginal from a nation-wide 
perspective.21 
When considering contemporary findings about the neighbour effect 
(Malcová 2011) and the population size of the average district town, one might well 
ask how a popular mayor, teacher, medical doctor or other local notables would 
fare in an election, assuming a context of non-developed local parties and a positive 
neighbour effect. The Chamber of Deputies could easily turn into a body of elected 
local politicians and regionally or locally known personalities whose support would 
not extent beyond the boundaries of their town. 
(2) The second weakness, which is perhaps a direct consequence of the absence 
of the threshold in a majority system, would be increased fragmentation. To 
illustrate the issue I discuss the actual make-up of the Czech Senate which obtains 
its legitimacy from a two-round majority electoral system. 
Table 12 details Senate elections to date. The proportion of senators elected as 
independents or representing regional parties ranged from a low of 12 % in 1996 
                                                 
20 Voter turnout was 59.48 % in 2013, 62.60 % in 2010 and 64.47 % in 2006. Thus it slowly decreases 
over time, but has been relatively homogeneous regionally. 
21 As an anonymous reviewer of this article rightly pointed out, introduction of a majoritarian 
electoral system can reduce or block representation of marginal groups in the parliament. However, 
the opposite can be true as well, depending on the geographical distribution of such groups in the 
country (for example the German speaking population in South Tyrol). In the Czech case, no 
minority or regional parties have been represented in the Chamber of Deputies since 1996. 
Therefore, introducing a majoritarian system for the chamber is unlikely to have adverse effect on 
minority representation in this case.  
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to more than 50 % in 2014 and 2016. If such a high number of independents were 
to sit in the Chamber of Deputies, obvious issues would arise for the working and 
voting of parliamentary party groups, and the fragmented chamber would be at 
serious risk of political instability.  
 
Table 8: Number of non-partisan senators (most of whom were elected with the 
support of a political party) or those elected on the lists of marginal parties  
Year of 
election 
Number of senators (27 in total are 
elected at any term) 
Expressed as share of the 
elected (%) 
1996 10 12 
1998 4 15 
2000 8 30 
2002 10 44 
2004 5 19 
2006 6 22 
2008 7 26 
2010 6 22 
2012 10 37 
2014 15 56 
2016 16 59 
Source: www.volby.cz.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has described the possible outcomes of introducing a one-round and 
a two-round majority system for the election of the Czech Chamber of Deputies. 
Several differences are to be expected. According to my model calculations, if the 
FPTP system were adopted, the winning party would always command a clear 
majority in the Chamber. In all three cases considered, the victor would hold more 
than half of the seats in the chamber and there would be no need for coalition 
governments, as has been the case to date under the proportional system. In 
addition, there would be a clear-cut opposition, consisting of fewer parties than is 
presently the case. Would such an electoral reform be likely to boost or hinder the 
emergence and/or rise of populist parties? My models suggest that the latter option 
is more likely. Also KSČM would probably be seriously hit.  
The model of a two-round system, with two best-placed candidates advancing 
into the run-off, shows similar tendencies. The party winning the popular vote 
would get its candidates into the second round in the greatest number of 
constituencies, and they would have to see off opponents not just from the other 
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major party but also from smaller competitors such as KDU-ČSL and KSČM. 
Given how the second round of the system typically works, further predictions are 
difficult, but the present state of knowledge suggests that elimination of KSČM 
candidates in the second round would be expectable rather than not. 
The adoption of a majority system would certainly bring many changes to the 
party system. One may conjecture that its introduction would create clear legislative 
majorities with sufficient legitimacy to form a government. My calculations indicate 
that fringe or isolated parties would probably be pushed further into the 
background. However, one also needs to note the risks involved in such a move. 
Bearing in mind the limitations of my calculations (as discussed above), these risks 
seem to outweigh the benefits. The chief risk is the disintegration of the party 
system and its replacement with an unstable and unpredictable atomised system, 
made up of non-partisans and independents with very narrow territorial legitimacy. 
This risk would be compounded by the lower election threshold. Combined with 
the habit of Czech politicians to combine multiple mandates (for example, that 
of an MP and a mayor), this might produce a significant risk factor. 
 
List of abbreviations 
 Full name Full name (English) Note 
ANO ANO 2011  populist 
party 
ČSSD Česká strana sociálně 
demokratická 
Czech Social 
Democratic Party 
 
KDU-
ČSL 
Křesťanskodemokratická unie 
– Československá strana 
lidová 
Christian and 
Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak 
People's Party 
 
KSČM Komunistická strana Čech 
a Moravy 
Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia 
 
Dawn Úsvit – Národní koalice Dawn – National 
Coalition 
populist 
party 
TOP09 TOP09  liberal party 
ODS Občanská demokratická 
strana 
Civic Democratic 
Party 
conservative 
party 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1. Projected combinations of parties contesting the second round of 
elections in 2013 according to regions  
2013 
TOP09/ 
ANO 
ČSSD/ 
ANO 
ČSSD/ 
KSČM 
ANO/ 
KSČM 
KDU-
ČSL/ 
ČSSD 
TOP09/ 
ČSSD 
ODS/ 
TOP09 
Prague 23      2 
STČ 7 15 2     
JHČ  6 7     
PLZ  9 2     
KAR  5      
ÚST  5 5 4    
LIB 5 1  2    
KRA 1 10      
PAR  9 1     
VYS  3 7     
JIH  14 7  1 1  
OLO  9 3     
MOR  13 9     
ZLI  9   3   
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz. 
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Table A2: Projected combinations of parties contesting the second round of 
elections in 2010 according to regions 
2010 
TOP09/ 
ODS 
ČSSD/ 
ODS 
ČSSD/ 
KSČM 
TOP09/ 
ČSSD 
ČSSD/ 
VV 
Prague 25     
STČ 6 18    
JHČ 3 10    
PLZ 2 8 1   
KAR  3 1 1  
ÚST  12 1  1 
LIB 5 2  1  
KRA 5 6    
PAR  9 1   
VYS  7 2 1  
JIH 2 18 3   
OLO  9 3   
MOR  17 5   
ZLI 1 11    
Source: Own calculation based on www.volby.cz.  
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Figure A1. Regions in the Czech Republic 
 
Source: Own map based on www.volby.cz. 
 
Table A3: List of Czech Regions  
Czech name English name Abbreviation 
Praha Prague Prague 
Středočeský kraj Central Bohemian region STČ 
Jihočeský kraj South Bohemian region JHČ 
Plzeňský kraj Pilsen region PLZ 
Karlovarský kraj Karlovy Vary region KAR 
Ústecký kraj Ústí nad Labem region ÚST 
Liberecký kraj Liberec region LIB 
Královéhradecký kraj Hradec Králové region KRA 
Pardubický kraj Pardubice region PAR 
Vysočina Vysočina VYS 
Jihomoravský kraj South Moravian region JIH 
Olomoucký kraj Olomouc region OLO 
Moravskoslezský kraj Moravia-Silesia region MOR 
Zlínský kraj Zlín region ZLI 
Source: www.volby.cz 
